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INCENTIVE PROBLEMS  
IN THE HUNGARIAN ENERGY-BALANCING 
MECHANISM
This paper examines the functioning of the balancing market of the electricity sector 
in Hungary. Balancing energy is an ancillary service, which is used by the transmission 
system operator (TSO) to guarantee the continuous supply of electricity. The TSO 
resolves unforeseen imbalances by calling on power plants in real time to increase 
or decrease their production (called upward and downward regulation). In order to 
comply with the balancing mechanism and settlement process, market participants 
organize into so-called balancing groups led by the balancing responsible party (usu-
ally a trader or supplier). Based on the forecast of the balancing group’s day-ahead 
production and consumption, the balancing responsible party (BRP) prepares the 
schedule of the balancing group, forwards it to the TSO, and then settles the imbal-
ances with the TSO resulting from any deviation from the announced schedule. In 
our study we examine the question of how current balancing energy and imbalance 
prices affect the incentives on suppliers to keep their portfolio balanced. Taking only 
the price difference between negative and positive imbalance prices into consider-
ation, we can say that the incentive on suppliers to avoid imbalances is very strong 
in the Hungarian market. However, we also show that because of the asymmetrical 
penalties for being long versus short, suppliers are inclined to under-contract energy 
on the wholesale market. Finally, our analyses also reveal that the current structure 
of the purchase and settlement price of balancing energy motivates the public utility 
wholesaler (the BRP for the public utility balancing group) to nominate more than 
its expected load.
INTRODUCTION
Since the liberalization of the Hungarian electricity market in 2003, it has been 
functioning as a dual market: there is an open market for authorized consumers, 
and a public utility market with prices set by the authorities. The market was lib-
eralized gradually, in several phases. Beginning in January 2003 all consumers with 
electricity consumption higher than 6.5 GWh, and as of July 2004 all industrial 
consumers  – together representing 70 percent of all consumers – have had the 
opportunity to choose their supplier freely.
The first phase of liberalization was characterized by great consumer activity. By 
the end of 2004 the consumption of consumers opting for an open market reached 
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20 percent of the total domestic consumption. The import competition resulting 
from the liberalization of external trade played the main role in the fast-paced 
expansion of this competitive market segment. The import share of open market 
consumers in the electricity supply was over 60 percent of the total in 2004. After 
the opportunities brought by import-based growth ran out, the competitive market 
slowed down significantly. While the share of open market consumption reached 
25 percent by the end of 2005 and it was as high as 30 percent by the end of 2006, 
there was a sharp drop to 20 percent at the beginning of 2007, when open market 
consumers returned en masse to public utilities.
In spite of the strong activity on the demand side and the savings realized by 
large consumers – which were very significant at the beginning – the competition 
in Hungary is characterized by severely distorted market conditions. The long-term 
power purchase agreements between MVM (Hungarian Electricity Ltd.) and power 
generators present the biggest problem. Based on these agreements 65 percent of 
domestic power generation and 80 percent of domestic electricity sales are con-
trolled by MVM. This means that although the ownership structure of the Hun-
garian power generation market is fragmented, the market itself is overwhelmingly 
dominated by MVM. We have to add that due to the restrictions on international 
competition, domestic conditions play a more important role in the development 
of power market competition than in other markets.
This paper examines the functioning of the balancing market of the electricity sec-
tor in Hungary. It is necessary to have a balancing energy market in order to control 
and financially settle unforeseen imbalances in the electricity market. The company 
responsible for the reliability of the electric power system called Hungarian Transmis-
sion System Operator, or MAVIR for short, is in charge of the purchase and settlement 
of balancing energy. MAVIR prepares the system schedule from the schedules that 
have been submitted by BRPs. This schedule contains the planned generation-con-
sumption balance of the country for every 15 minute. If there is any deficiency in the 
system balance – for instance, because the actual generation by plants is less than the 
agreed amount – the TSO can restore the balance by drawing on reserves, and then 
charge the costs of balancing to those participants who failed to meet their schedule.
THE PROCUREMENT OF BALANCING ENERGY
In 2006, the Hungarian TSO purchased around 1300 MW reserve capacity from 
domestic power plants, which is approximately 20 percent of the annual peak con-
sumption (approximately 6300 MW). The reserves have varying levels of response 
time, i.e. how fast they can be made available. Deficits are typically balanced out 
by calling upon the reserve that can be made available at the shortest notice, and if 
the deficit is very big and/or lasts for a longer period, cheaper and larger reserves 
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with slower response times gradually replace the fast ones. The total cost of reserves 
utilized by MAVIR is approximately HUF 25bn, which increases the cost of every 
KWh supplied by about 0.7 Hungarian forints.
Just like the energy market, the procurement of balancing power can also be 
organised as a competitive market. One of the most frequently used methods is 
when the TSO holds auctions at regular intervals (once a year, daily, or every hour) 
to procure reserves of the required quantity and composition for upward and down-
ward regulation.
In the current model MAVIR procures control reserves at daily auctions. Within 
each reserve type participants submit two-part bids – containing capacity fee and 
energy price – for both upward and downward regulation. Settlement is based on 
the offer price: winning bidders get the capacity fee they bid for, and if activated 
they receive the energy fee contained in the bid submitted.
The main obstacle to competition on the balancing energy market (among oth-
ers) is the long-term purchase agreement system. The dominance of MVM is made 
even more obvious on this market due to import competition being excluded (very 
restricted). MAVIR covers its regulation reserve needs almost exclusively from 
MVM: in 2005 MVM’s share was as high as 95 percent. The regulatory authority cur-
rently addresses this problem by requiring MVM to submit bids to the balancing en-
ergy market that do not exceed the settlement prices of its contracts with generators.
THE SETTLEMENT OF BALANCING POWER
Market participants organize into so-called balancing groups, and the TSO settles 
the real-time imbalances financially with the balancing responsible parties (BRPs). 
The BRPs calculate what the members (power plants, traders, consumers) of their 
respective balancing group inject into the system as well as what they take out, and 
forward the balanced schedule to the system operator one day in advance. The 
settlement of balancing energy is based on the difference between the scheduled 
amount and the actual amount generated (loaded into the system) and consumed 
(withdrawn). The cost or revenue of balancing for the balancing group splits between 
the members of the balancing group.
The settlement price of balancing energy
The settlement of balancing energy, with those participants who require settle-
ment, can be done in two ways. In the so called single-price system, the same 
price  – though with the opposite sign – is applied for both the negative and positive 
imbalances. In the so called double price accounting system negative and positive 
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imbalance prices are different; the former is higher than the latter. To settle balanc-
es in the United States they tend to use the single price system, while in European 
countries they prefer the double price system (Glachant–Saguan [2007]).
Double imbalance prices provide a strong incentive for market participants to 
keep their own position in balance. Since the energy price charged for negative 
imbalances is typically higher than the day-ahead price, and the energy price paid 
for positive imbalances is typically lower, the system penalizes both taking more 
or taking less. The measure of “penalty” for both negative and positive imbalances 
(Bnegative and Bpositive) can be expressed as the following:
Bnegative = NIP – P
Bpositive = P – PIP,
where P is the market price (for example the relevant power exchange price), NIP 
(negative imbalance price) is the settlement price of negative imbalances, and PIP 
(positive imbalance price) is the settlement price of positive imbalances. The cost 
of being short can therefore be measured as the difference in costs between buying 
energy on the balancing market and the wholesale market. The cost of any devia-
tion from the submitted schedule can be reduced by keeping to the schedule more 
accurately, i.e. reducing the standard deviation of imbalances.
An additional feature of the double-pricing system is that often the price charged 
for imbalances does not only depend on the market player’s own balance (be it posi-
tive or negative), but also on the direction of its balance relative to the overall status 
of the system (same direction/opposite direction). In countries that have their own 
electricity exchanges, the settlement of imbalances that are in the same direction as 
that of the system are based on the cost of balancing services, while the settlement 
of imbalances that are in the opposite direction are based on day-ahead power ex-
change prices. By using day-ahead prices the exposure of market parties to balancing 
risks is lower, as normally the price of the day-ahead market is lower (higher) than 
price of negative imbalance (positive imbalance) of the balancing market. Using less 
“penalizing” settlement prices in the case of imbalances in the opposite directions 
is justifiable, as participants with opposite direction balances actually decrease the 
real-time costs of the balancing of the whole system.
In the absence of an organized market in Hungary we have no reference price, 
which we could refer to when settling imbalances that are in the opposite direction 







negative (short) negative imbalance price 
negative imbalance price, if there was 
upward regulation, otherwise 0
positive (long)
positive imbalance price, if there was 
downward regulation, otherwise 0
positive imbalance price
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as the system balance. Currently the way the settlement price is set does not depend 
on whether the direction of individual deviation is the same as that of the system 
deviation. A player with a negative balance will be charged the price of negative im-
balance (NIP) even if the system has a net surplus, provided that in the settlement 
period the system operator performed both downward and upward regulation. If 
there was no regulation in the opposite direction to the net system balance, then 
the settlement price will be equal to zero.
The rules of setting imbalance prices recently changed in Hungary. Earlier the 
unit price of balancing energy was fixed, the settlement prices of positive and neg-
ative deviations were determined by multiplying the public utility wholesale prices 
with fixed factors.1 In order for balancing energy to correspond more to the costs 
of regulation performed by the TSO, as of July 1, 2006 the fixed price system was 
replaced by cost-based pricing. Under the new scheme the settlement price of im-
balances is based on the average procurement cost of balancing services.
TABLE 2 • The settlement price of imbalances in Hungary in 2006 (HUF/KWh)
Period The settlement price of negative imbalances The settlement price of positive imbalances
January 2006–June 2006
 Peak period* 22.65 0.88
 Off-peak period* 11.23 0.00
 Average** 13.47 0.26
July 2006
 Average*** 15.28 0.00
  * Unit price imposed by the authorities.
  ** Fifteen-minute settlement price average, assuming that in 90 percent of the settlement periods there was some downward 
or upward regulation.
 *** Fifteen-minute settlement price average.
An assessment of the Hungarian imbalance price system
The Hungarian balancing mechanism will be assessed against the requirements 
considered necessary to achieve healthy operation of the balancing energy market. 
We examine how much the current system of imbalance prices encourage suppliers 
to avoid imbalances, how big is the risk it poses to market participants, whether it 
helps minimise overall balancing costs, and how much room it leaves for arbitrage 
or other undesirable gaming.
 1 The peak and off-peak period unit prices of negative imbalances were respectively 1.3 times the peak 
and off-peak period public utility wholesale prices set out in the regulation. The price of positive im-
balances in peak and off-peak periods were equal to the pro-rata average of peak and off-peak peri-
od public utility wholesale prices, while in peak periods they were equal to 0 (Network Code [2006]).
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As the costs of system-level balancing are usually considerable (see below in the 
study), market participants need to be encouraged to cover their generation and 
consumption as accurately as possible. For example, the more accurate forecast of 
generation and load and better incentive mechanisms within the balancing group 
can help to meet individual schedules more accurately.
However, it is important to see that the measures taken by BRPs to avoid imbal-
ances are costly, even if these costs are borne not at the level of centralised system 
control, but by the market participants themselves. Therefore, the minimisation of 
system balancing costs cannot be considered the ultimate goal. If this happened, it 
would lead to a very high degree of individual balancing, which in turn would in-
crease the cost of individual balancing too much. Theoretically, the pricing system 
of the balancing energy market can be considered optimal if it provides incentives 
for individual balancing of market participants to such an extent that its marginal 
cost is exactly the same as the marginal cost of system level balancing.
IMBALANCE PRICE SPREAD
The economic cost of being short or long depends very much on the difference 
between the negative and positive imbalance prices. To demonstrate the potential 
impact of the spread between negative and positive imbalance prices, let us consid-
er a BRP owning only load (i.e. a supplier). Assuming that the supplier’s real-time 
deviation from its schedule is a random variable following normal distribution, 
and that the opportunity cost of buying or selling balancing energy are identical 
(NIP – P = P – PIP = B). The average value of the imbalance costs of the supplier 
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where σ is the standard deviation of imbalances, and 2B is the difference between 
the negative and positive imbalance prices (see Appendix 1 for a detailed description 
of the calculation). So if a supplier can predict the consumption of its clients with 
a five percent margin of error, and the difference between imbalance prices is EUR 
50/MWh, then the average cost of balancing for the supplier will be approximately 
EUR 1/MWh. If this price difference increases, then the projected balancing cost 
will increase, and so will the incentive to keep their portfolio balanced.
The difference between imbalance prices in Hungary has been EUR 50–60/
MWh in the past 18 months, which is very high, compared to price differences 
abroad (see Table 3 and Figure 1). The price system of Hungarian balancing energy 
can therefore be considered very penalizing. We have to add that expensive balanc-
ing energy may act to stunt the development of competition especially in the early 
phases of liberalization.
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FIGURE 1 • Average imbalance and day-ahead prices on the Hungarian, French  
































Source: www.eh.gov.hu and 
www.mavir.hu.
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Source: www.elexon.co.uk and 
www.apxgroup.com.
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Suppliers that have recently entered the market naturally have a smaller clientele 
than their more established competitors. Due to the fact that it is much harder to 
plan the schedule, service to smaller consumer portfolios can only be provided if we 
make greater use of balancing energy. Balancing is consequently a greater burden 
to smaller suppliers than to big ones. Hence, the high exposure to balancing risk 
may act to prevent new players from entering the market.
Asymmetrical penalties
Figure 1 illustrates yet another peculiar aspect of balancing energy pricing in Hun-
gary. While in England and France the position of negative and positive imbalance 
prices with respect to the wholesale price can be said to be symmetrical, in Hungary 
the position of imbalance prices compared to wholesale price are asymmetric. The 
tendency that the difference between the wholesale price and the positive imbal-
ance price significantly exceed the difference between negative imbalance price and 
wholesale price can be observed since January 2006.
In the price structure of Hungary, the cost of settling a long position is signifi-
cantly higher than that of a short positions (P – PIP > NIP – P). It is easy to see how 
TABLE 3 • Imbalance prices in European countries, 2005 (EUR/MWh)
Country
The average price of negative 
imbalances 
The average price of positive 
imbalances Price difference
Austria 51 24 27
Belgium 56 12 44
Czech Republic 21 0 21
Denmark 36 27 9
United Kingdom 55 39 16
Finland 32 27 5
France 50 45 5
Greece 44 44 0
Netherlands 69 28 41
Ireland 69 60 9
Poland 37 24 13
Hungary 40 0 40
Germany 70 2 68
Norway 29 29 0
Italy 102 23 79
Portugal 58 23 35
Sweden 32 28 4
Source: EC [2005]: Report on progress in creating the internal gas and electricity market, COM(2005) 568 final, Commission of the 
European Communities p. 67.
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this encourages suppliers to under contract energy on the wholesale market and 
thus avoiding long positions.
Let us look at the behaviour of a supplier when P – PIP > NIP – P. When making 
decision on the wholesale purchase of energy, the supplier is faced with the following 
problem. If he cuts the wholesale purchase of energy by one unit, he gains the sav-
ing of the power exchange price, lessens his exposure to the PIP (i.e. the likelihood 
that he ultimately goes long and needs to sell the surplus at PIP), while raising its 
exposure to the NIP (i.e. the risk that it subsequently goes short and needs to make 
up the shortfall at the PIP). Defining ps = the probability that the position of the 
supplier is ultimately short, this can be expressed as
 Gain = P – psNIP – (1 – ps)PIP. (2
To minimize the cost of his wholesale energy purchase plus the expected costs of 
balancing, the supplier will reduce his purchasing of energy down to the point where 
there is no further gain from cutting down on trading, i.e.
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. (4)
If we put the averages of wholesale and balancing energy prices for the first six 
months of 2006 into the equation (P = 9.85 HUF/KWh, NIP = 13.47 HUF/KWh, 
PIP = 0.28 HUF/KWh), we get the following: the optimal probability of a supplier 
going short in the given period was approximately 0.73. Therefore, a supplier can 
minimize his expected costs in the period studied by purchasing only so much en-
ergy as to result in a short position for 73 percent of the settlement periods.
In Appendix 1 we provide a detailed assessment of the optimal degree of suppli-
ers under-contracting. Our calculations show that in the first six months of 2006 
the optimum degree of under-contracting for a supplier was on average equal to 
0.6 times the standard deviation of the consumption forecast error σ.2 So assuming 
for example that the supplier has a demand forecast error standard deviation of 5 
percent, then according to our estimation he must have contracted only 97 percent 
of its projected consumption. If all participants are inclined to under contract, then 
of course the whole system will also tend to be “under-contracted”. On the basis of 
this example, and assuming that there are altogether four suppliers on the market, all 
having equal shares, the system imbalance has a mean of –3 percent, and a standard 
deviation of 2.5 percent (= 5% /   4) (see Figure 2).
 2 In addition to trying to minimize the costs there are of course other factors (for example arbitrage) 
that can drive the behaviour of market participants. Naturally, when calculating the optimal degree 
of under-contracting we did not take these factors into consideration.
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The current balancing mechanism with unequal NIP – P and P – PIP spreads im-
poses high system balancing costs compared to the costs that would be incurred 
by a symmetrical spread around the day-ahead price (assuming that the difference 
between NIP and PIP is the same under the two pricing regimes). Since the frequency 
and the maximum value of negative imbalances increases, the system operator has 
to keep larger generation capacities in reserve for upward regulation.
In order to quantify this latter effect, let us compare the amount of upward 
regulation capacity needed to achieve a LOLP3 of 0.1 percent under the exist-
ing pricing scheme as well as under a pricing scheme with equal NIP – P and 
P – PIP spreads (NIPs = 16.445 HUF/KWh and PIPs = 3.255 HUF/KWh, that is 
NIPs – P = P – PIPs = 6.595 HUF/KWh and NIPs – PIPs = 2 × 6.595 HUF/KWh). As 
shown in the close-up view in Figure 2, under the current pricing scheme the need 
of the system for upward regulation reserve reaches 10.5 percent of load, while with 
symmetrical spread around P it would only reach 7.5 percent.
Market dominance and “gaming”
Table 4 shows the developments in regulating and balancing energy prices in the 
past 18 months.
 3 LOLP = Loss of Load Probability
FIGURE 2 • Density function of system imbalance when the NIP–P and P–PIP spreads  
are equal and when they are not
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One of the most striking features of the Hungarian balancing energy market is the 
extremely low price of positive imbalances. Even considering that the key feature 
of the double pricing system is to incentivise more accurate planning, the size of 
penalty imposed on long positions seems to be unwarranted. The main reason for 
the low positive imbalance price is the fact that the Hungarian TSO receives a very 
low price for the surplus energy from the providers of downward regulation. In other 
words, the price of decremantal energy is very low (0 HUF/KWh) in the regulating 
market. This is due to the monopolistic structure of the regulating market, i.e. the 
fact that only MVM offers bids for decremental energy to the TSO.4 Besides having 
the ability to influence the prices of regulating services, MVM are also capable of 
manipulating the overall system balance. This is due to the large size of the public 
utility balancing group managed by MVM. The latter’s consumption accounts for 
65-70 percent of the total domestic consumption. This enables MVM to shift the 
system balance in a direction that is favourable to the company’s own interest.
Next we show that in the present pricing system MVM is encouraged to nom-
inate more than its expected load (i.e. declare a larger than-anticipated load). Let 
us assume that MVM nominates more than its expected load and this brings the 
market into surplus. What happens in such situations? First, MVM as the single 
provider of regulating services will be called upon by the TSO to decrease output 
from its generators. The zero price of decremantal energy means that MVM pays 
nothing to the TSO for reducing its output. Second, MVM as the balance responsi-
ble party of the public utility balancing group will have a positive imbalance volume, 
which will be settled at the positive imbalance price of 0.24 HUF/kWh. Hence the 
net profit for MVM from pushing the system into a surplus is 0.24 HUF/kWh times 
the positive imbalance volume of the public utility balancing group. This arbitrage 
between the two markets could only be prevented if the positive imbalance prices 
were lower than the prices for decremental energy.
 4 Under sufficiently competitive conditions, the price for decremantal energy would come close to 
the variable cost of the least efficient operating plant (i.e. the plant with highest marginal cost).
TABLE 4 • Regulating and balancing energy prices in Hungary (HUF/KWh)
Period









January 2005–January 2005 8.2 0 13.90 0.23
February 2005–December 2005 8.8 0 15.50 0.25
January 2006–June 2006 12.9 0 14.40 0.24
July 2006–August 2006 14.3 0 14.30 0.00 ??
September 2006 20.48 0.90 ??
Note: the figures indicate the weighted average of the peak and off-peak prices values. Following the terminology of the Network 
Code we refer to the procurement side of the balancing energy market as “regulating market”, and the settlement side of it as 
“balancing market”.
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Although we have no data about the development of the position of the public utility 
balancing group, the available aggregate data on the system imbalance are in line 
with the prediction that MVM continuously nominates more than its expected 
load. In 2005, the total volume of upward regulation was 384 GWh, while that of 
downward regulation was 545 GWh, meaning that in the course of the past year 
the system balance was more often in surplus than in deficit. This, in combination 
with the predicted under-contracting behaviour of suppliers other than MVM (i.e. 
ones serving the free segment of the market), suggests that MVM indeed keeps 
nominating more than the expected load of the public utility balancing group.
The 15 minute increment data on system balance pertaining to July and August of 
2006 that were on the Hungarian TSO’s webpage also suggest over-nomination by the 
MVM. As seen in Figure 3, in each hour of the day in August the TSO purchased on 
average more downward regulation than upward regulation. In contrast, in July the 
direction of regulation was predominantly upward. In Figure 3 we also show for each 
hour of the day the estimated average spread between negative imbalance price and 
day-ahead price5. We can observe that in July the market price in the peak hours signif-
icantly exceeded the settlement price for negative imbalances, creating a huge incen-
tive for arbitrage between the two markets. We suspect that in this period suppliers 
serving the free segment of the market generated large deficits in their scheduled port-
folio, thereby making it impossible for MVM to push the system balance into surplus.
 5 This latter was calculated on the basis of the EEX day-ahead prices.
FIGURE 3 • Direction of regulation versus the NIP – P spread in the Hungarian electricity 
market in July and August 2006
MW EUR/MWh
Hours
Average net amount of regulation (August)
Average net amount of regulation (July)
EEX day-ahead price – Hungarian NIP (August)
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CONCLUSIONS
The balancing mechanism plays a central role in the wholesale electricity market. 
On the one hand, it is crucial in maintaining network stability and, on the other, 
it allows for a market-based settlement of imbalances between network users and 
the TSO. However, designing a balancing mechanism is a very complex task. The 
price system needs to incentivise the BRP to stay in balance, needs to minimize the 
social costs of balancing and at the same time needs to be robust against activities 
that threaten the functioning of the market.
In our study we examined the incentive properties of the current Hungarian 
energy balancing mechanism. We showed that the large spread between the NIP 
and the PIP creates a strong incentive for BRPs to reduce their imbalances resulting 
from inaccurate forecasts. On the other hand, we also show that, due to the exist-
ence of asymmetric penalties in the price system, BRPs have an incentive to under 
contract in the wholesale market as a hedge against real-time long positions and 
the associated higher imbalance costs. Finally, we demonstrated that MVM, who 
is responsible for the balancing of the public utility balancing group, has a strong 
incentive to nominate more that its expected load. This is due to the inconsistency 
in the pricing of decremantal energy versus positive imbalances, which is allowing 
for a positive spread between the negative imbalance price and the decremantal 
energy price. As a monopoly provider of downward regulation and the leader of the 
largest balancing group, MVM can push the system balance into surplus and then 
earn a positive profit from selling energy in real time to the TSO.
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APPENDIX
1. The imbalance cost of a free market supplier
The aim of this appendix is to provide an estimate of the imbalance cost of a free 
market supplier under the assumption that NIP – P = P – PIP; i.e. its cost exposure to 
negative and positive imbalances are the same. (Note that under such prices a sup-
plier has no incentive to nominate differently from its expected load.) Let B = NIP – P (= P – PIP) and x a random variable denoting the supplier’s imbalance position. Then 
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where f(x) is the probability density function of x. If x follows a normal distribution 
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So if for example a supplier has a demand forecast error standard deviation of 5 per-
cent and the difference between the negative and positive imbalance prices 2B is EUR 
50/MWh, then the imbalance cost of the supplier will be approximately EUR 1/MWh.
2. The optimal degree of under-contracting for a free market supplier
The aim of this appendix is to provide an estimate of the degree of under-contract-
ing by a supplier in the Hungarian electricity market. Q denotes the supplier’s cus-
tomers’ consumption. Real-time consumption then equals the expected amount of 
consumption plus the forecast error, θ, which is distributed according to F(θ). To 
meet its customers’ demands, the supplier purchases (1 + u)Q amount of energy on 
the wholesale market, where u stands for the degree of under-contracting.
If the real-time consumption is less than the contracted energy, i.e. θ < u, then 
the surplus energy is sold at the PIP (positive imbalance price). The supplier’s loss 
can be expressed as the following:
K = (u – θ)(P – PIP)
222 László Paizs
If the real-time consumption is greater than the contracted energy, i.e. θ > u, then 
the missing energy has to be covered in the balancing market at the NIP (negative 
imbalance price). The loss made by the supplier will be
K = (u – θ)(NIP – P).
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where f is the probability density function of the forecast error. The optimal degree 
of under-contracting is then u that minimizes K: 
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where F is the probability distribution of the forecast error θ. Given F, the optimal 
degree of under-contracting u can be solved. Assume that F is normal with mean 
0 and standard variation σ. In the first six months of 2006, the average day-ahead 
price P was 9.85 HUF/KWh, the average NIP 13.47 HUF/KWh and the average PIP 
0.28 HUF/KWh. Using these values we get
F(u) = 0.2737.
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 Our calculation shows that a supplier should on average be 0.6σ under-contracted 
in the first half of 2006. Assuming that the supplier had a consumption forecast 
error standard deviation of 5 percent, he should optimally cover only 97 percent of 
its expected consumption on the wholesale market.
